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BEYOND THE DOHA ROUND: TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT
FACILITATION IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
YONG-SHIK LEE, PH.D (CANTAB.)*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which
aims to advance the development interests of developing countries in
the world trading system,' has not been completed for over a decade
due to the critical differences among the Member States (Members).
While international trade is essentially important for the economic
development of developing countries and the rules for international
trade have significant impacts on developing countries with respect to
their ability to adopt development policies, 2 the current WTO system
does not adequately address the development concerns of developing
countries and the rules fail to facilitate economic development. The
Doha Round was launched with an objective of meeting the
development interests of developing countries, but its progress has been
sluggish, reflecting large gaps in positions on development issues
between developed and developing countries. 3
Even if the current Doha Round is concluded successfully, with its
negotiation agendas and objectiveS4 met in the final negotiations, it
would not be sufficient to fill the regulatory gap in the current WTO
system for development facilitation through international trade, nor
does it address the fundamental problem and imbalance in the current
* Prof. Y.S. Lee is Director and Professorial Fellow of the Law and Development Institute
and the Editor-in-Chief of the Law and Development Review. Professor Lee is the author
of "Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System" (Cambridge University Press,
2006, reprint 2009), "Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal Analysis" (Kluwer
Law International, 2003, 2005, 2007), and a co-author and the head editor of "Law and
Development Perspective on International Trade Law" (Cambridge University Press,
2011). Correspondences to the author: (e-mail) wtogeneva@hotmail.com.
1. The Doha Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda
e/ddae.htm (last visited Dec. 3 2011). The Doha Round agendas and the main areas of
negotiation include agriculture, non-agriculture market access (NAMA), services,
intellectual property, trade and development, and trade facilitation.
2. YONG-SHIK LEE, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 4
(2006).
3. Id. at 10.
4. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 1.
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organizational structure of the WTO. The negotiation agendas and
mandates of the Doha Round are not sufficient to achieve the reform
that would correct the current problem in the regulatory framework
and in the institutional apparatus of the WTO. The reform will have to
be considered and discussed in a subsequent round.
This paper, based on the author's previous works,5 provides a brief
account of the "development deficit" in the regulatory framework of the
WTO and its organizational apparatus and of the reform proposal to
meet the development needs of developing countries, as mandated by
the WTO Agreement itself.6 , The next section discusses the issues with
the current regulatory framework with a proposal for a set of
development-facilitation provisions, named the Agreement on
Development Facilitation (ADF).7 Section III provides a discussion of
the "development deficit" in the current WTO structure and proposes
organizational reform. Section IV draws conclusions.
5. See generally Yong-Shik Lee, Development and the World Trade Organization:
Proposal for the Agreement on Development Facilitation and the Council for Trade and
Development in the WTO, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 291-319
(Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009), available at http://www.law.umn.
eduluploads/nI/ON/nlONhzUtTbUj28QsfHdgbw/wto-Lee.pdf; YONG-SHIK LEE, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH WORLD TRADE: A DEVELOPING WORLD PERSPECTIVE 3-32; THE
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT INST., LAW AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 105-29 (Yong-Shik Lee et al. eds., 2011); LEE, supra note 2; Yong-Shik Lee,
Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System (Revisited): Proposals for reform of
WTO Governance, in MAKING GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT 301-
27 (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011); Yong-Shik Lee, Facilitating Development in the
World Trade Organization: A Proposal for the Council for Trade and Development and the
Agreement on Development Facilitation (ADF), 6 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. AND TRADE L. 177
(2006); Yong-Shik Lee, Facilitating Development in the World Trading System: A Proposal
for Development Facilitation Tariff and Development Facilitating Subsidy, 38 J. WORLD
TRADE 935 (2004), available at http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/document.php?id=
TRAD2004039&type=toc&num=3&.
6. The Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
("WTO Agreement") provides in relevant part, "[r]ecognizing further that there is a need
for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least
developed among them, secure a share in the growth of international trade commensurate
with the needs of their economic development. . . ." Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter
Marrakesh Agreement]. The agenda of the current Doha Round ("Doha Development
Agenda" or "DDA") also aims to facilitate economic development of developing countries
through international trade. See supra note 1.
7. The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief account of the regulatory and
organizational gap in the WTO and the points of the proposed reform; thus, those who
seek a more extensive discussion should refer to the author's other work, such as
RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 2.
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II. REGULATORY REFORM
A. Current Regulatory Imbalance
The current rules of international trade represented by WTO
disciplines apply to 195 Members of the WTO, thus constituting the
global regulatory regime of international trade.8 Various agreements
and understandings (WTO agreements) concluded in the Uruguay
Round (1986-1994) were added to the rules of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had been implemented since 1947
and still remain as the core principles of the international trade law.9
The subsequent WTO agreements reinforce the GATT rules, where
applicable, by providing detailed procedures, provisions, and
implementation mechanisms.
While most of key GATT provisions have been elaborated by more
detailed WTO agreements with implementation mechanisms,10 none of
the GATT's development-facilitation provisions, such as Article XVIII
and Part IV provisions (Articles XXXVI ~ XXXVIII), has been reinforced
by any WTO agreement. Some of the GATT principles, such as
maximum tariff bindings in Article II, restrain the ability of developing
countries to adopt trade-related development policies. The development-
facilitation provisions in the GATT, such as Article XVIII, address this
issue by enabling developing countries to adopt tariff measures beyond
their previous commitments under Article II for development
purposes."
8. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 6, art. XIV. Compliance with the WTO legal
disciplines is mandatory for all Members: Members are required to bring their own laws
and practices in compliance with the rules of WTO legal disciplines.
9. See WTO Legal Texts, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/englis/docs-e/
legal-ellegal e.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2011), for the GATTIWTO rules including
Uruguay Round agreements, understandings, and GATT provisions.
10. For instance, GATT Article XIX on Emergency Action on Imports of Particular
Products has been developed into the Agreement on Safeguards. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade art. XIX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 1867 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT]; Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S 154. GATT Article VI on Anti-
dumping and Countervailing Duties has been developed into two separate Agreements:
one on anti-dumping (ADP Agreement) and the other on subsidies and countervailing
measures (SCM Agreement). GATT art. VI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 1867 U.N.T.S.
194; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex lA, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter ADP Agreement]; Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter
SCM Agreement]. For the text of the GATT provisions and agreements, see WTO Legal
Texts, supra note 9.
11. GATT, supra note 10, art. XVIII, para. 2.
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Nonetheless, certain requirements under the GATT's development-
facilitation provisions, including those in Article XVIII and Articles
XXXVI XXXVIII,12 cause difficulties for developing countries to adopt
those measures. Article XVIII allows developing countries, whose
economies only support low standards of living and are in the early
stages of development,' 3 to adopt tariff measures beyond the maximum
tariff bindings to which they are committed under Article II in order to
promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to
raising the general standard of living of its people.14 However,
developing countries are also required to engage in negotiation with the
interested Members and compensation may well be required as a result
of any modification.15 Those negotiations can be lengthy, which may not
allow developing countries to adopt the necessary measures in time, or
may never be concluded successfully with the interested parties.
Developing countries with limited economic resources may not be able
to offer compensation required by the other parties. Article XVIII
allows developing countries to adopt the measure even if negotiation
should not be successful, provided that they offer compensatory
measure at the time of applying the measure, 16 but it is subject to
retaliatory measures by the other interested Members should the WTO
consider the compensation inadequate.' 7
Another set of major development-facilitation provisions of the
GATT, Articles XXXVI XXXVIII,18 lays out an impressive array of
preferential treatments in favor of developing countries. Article XXXVI
addresses the vital role of export earnings in economic development, the
possible authorization of special measures to promote trade and
development, and the need for more favorable and acceptable conditions
of access to world markets for primary products (on which many
developing countries depend).' 9 Article XXXVII elaborates the
commitment of developed country Members' to assist developing
countries with economic development. These commitments include
according high priority to the reduction and elimination of import
barriers to products of particular export interest to developing
Members, refraining from introducing or increasing import barriers to
such products, and according high priority to the reduction and
elimination of policies specifically applicable to primary products wholly
12. See WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 9, for the text of Article XVIII and Articles
XXXVI-XXXVIII.
13. GATT, supra note 10, art. XVIII, para. 4(a).
14. Id. art. XVIII, para. 7(a).
15. Id.
16. Id. art. XVIII, para. 7(b).
17. Id.
18. WTO Legal Texts, supra note 9.
19. GATT, supra note 10, art. XXXVI, paras. 1-4.
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or mainly produced in developing countries, which hamper the growth
of consumption of those products. 20 Article XXXVIII calls for joint
action and institutional effort by the WTO to assist developing
countries. 21 These provisions, however, are declaratory rather than
obligatory for absence of sanction in the case of violation of those duties.
Article XXXVII also allows developed countries to avoid any of those
obligations by legislating against them. 2 2
Subsequent WTO agreements, while reinforcing other key GATT
provisions, 23 do not address the implementation and enforcement
problems of the development-facilitation provisions in the GATT,
including those of Article XVIII and Articles XXXVI-XXXVIII, leaving
regulatory vacuum in this area. The mainstream neo-classical
economic stance does not support state-led development policies, such
as infant industry promotion policies embodied in Article XVIII,24 but
the policy decision has already been made to allow developing countries
this option when the Article was adopted by the GATT. Thus it would
be only fair and adequate that those development-facilitation provisions
are reinforced by subsequent agreements with detailed implementation
provisions and enforcement mechanisms. The current WTO rules offer
special and differential (S&D) treatment in favor of developing
countries.25 However, it is insufficient for the S&D provisions, which
are scattered throughout WTO agreements, are either temporary or
limited in coverage and extent. 26 The remainder of this section makes
brief proposals for regulatory revisions to amend this development
deficit in WTO legal disciplines. 27
B. Reform Proposal
The development deficit in the regulatory system can be cured by
elaborating and reinforcing the development-facilitation provisions in
the form of a separate WTO agreement, as has been done with other
GATT provisions.28 This agreement can be named, "The Agreement on
20. Id. art. XXXVII, para. 1.
21. Id. art. XXXVIII, para. 2.
22. Id. art. XXXVII, para. 1.
23. See supra note 10.
24. LEE, supra note 2, at 62.
25. 145 S&D provisions are scattered throughout several WTO agreements,
understandings, and GATT articles. Twenty-two are applied exclusively to LDCs. For a
review of the special and differential treatment (S&D) provisions in the WTO, see Note by
Secretariat, Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO
Agreements and Decisions, WT/COMTDIW/77 (Oct. 25, 2000).
26. See LEE, supra note 2, at 40-41, for a detailed account of the limits of the S&D
provisions.
27. See id. ch. 2-6, for more detailed accounts of the proposals.
28. See supra note 10.
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Development Facilitation (ADF)."29 The Agreement may include rules
for new, permanent S&D treatment in the areas that have critical
implications for development such as tariff bindings, subsidies, anti-
dumping, trade-related intellectual property rights, and trade-related
investment measures. 30 The ADF can also provide a coherent
regulatory standard for determination of developing countries to benefit
from regulatory preferences. 31 A separate agreement will function as
exceptional rules to the other WTO agreements and its advantage is to
advance development interests without potentially complex revisions to
the existing agreements.
The maximum tariff binding under GATT Article 1132 has
important ramifications for development. Article II prohibits Members
from raising tariff rates beyond the maximum bindings that they have
agreed in the previous trade round.33 While the requirement provides
essential stability for international trading system, it also restrains the
ability of developing countries to adopt tariff measures beyond the
maximum bindings to promote domestic industries for development
purposes. As mentioned, the GATT has adopted the policy to allow this
measure by the provisions of Article XVIII, but the negotiation and
compensation requirement causes a considerable difficulty for
developing countries. 3 4
Development-Facilitation Tariff (DFT) has been proposed to
address this issue. 35 The DFT scheme enables developing countries to
set the maximum additional tariff rate beyond the tariff binding under
Article 11.36 It assigns a different maximum DFT rate to an individual
developing country on a sliding scale, to be determined in accordance
with its level of economic development measured by relevant economic
indicators such as per-capita gross national income (GNI) figures. 37
29. LEE, supra note 2, at 47.
30. Id. at 47-48.
31. Id. Under the current system, developing country status is self-declaratory and
the absence of a definition for developing country Members seems to create regulatory
ambiguity. See also Fan Cui, Who are the Developing Countries in the WTO?, 1 L. AND
DEV. REV. 123 (2008).
32. GATT, supra note 10, art. II.
33. Id.
34. See discussion supra Part II.A.
35. LEE, supra note 2, at 66.
36. Id. at 68-70.
37. Id at 68-69. For instance, suppose that the maximum DFT rate is set at 100
percent over the tariff binding and the economic threshold for an eligible developing
country to benefit from a DFT is 15,000 USD per capita GNI. Then any country that has a
higher per-capita income than 15,000 USD will not be eligible for a DFT. Country A with
the per capita GNI of 3,000 USD, which is 20 percent of the threshold income, will be
allowed to apply a DFT of 80 percent (100% x (100% 20%) = 80%). Country B with the
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While negotiation and compensation requirements are not imposed on
developing countries, 38 a series of procedural requirements, such as a
report setting forth rationale for the proposed increase in tariffs, public
hearing, notice, and gradual liberalization and elimination of the DFT
after a set period of time, should reduce the possibility of an abuse. 39
A similar treatment can be considered for subsidies. Government
subsidies are important development tools for developing countries, 40
and the WTO recognizes their importance for economic development. 41
Yet, some of the key trade-related subsidies, such as export subsidies
and import-substitution subsidies, are prohibited by the current WTO
rules. 42 The other kinds of subsidies that affect the trade of other
Members adversely are also "actionable": i.e. subject to trade sanctions
including countervailing measures. 43  As Dani Rodrik has aptly
described, the current trade rules have made "a significant dent in the
ability of developing countries to employ intelligently-designed industrial
policies." 44
Historically, subsidies have played an important role in the
economic development of today's developed countries, 45 and developing
countries should be able to adopt trade-related subsidies without the
fear of retaliatory measures from developed countries. 46 The concept of
the sliding scale, which is used for the DFT, can be applied to subsidies
otherwise prohibited or actionable under the current WTO rule. 4 7
per capita GNI of 12,000 USD, which is 80 percent of the threshold income, will be
allowed to apply a DFT of 20 percent (100% x (100% - 80%) = 20%. Id. at 69.
38. See discussion supra Part II.A. Those requirements are present for the
application of Article XVIII measures.
39. LEE, supra note 2, at 66-67. The Agreement on Safeguards also includes those
procedural requirements. See Agreement on Safeguards supra note 10, arts. 3, 7, 12.
40. LEE, supra note 2, at 52-54.
41. SCM Agreement, supra note 10, art. 27, para. 1.
42. Id. art. 3.
43. Id. arts. 5-7.
44. Dani Rodrik, Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century 34-35 (Sept. 2004)
(unpublished paper prepared for the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization) (on file with Harvard University), available at http://www.hks.harvard
.edu/fs/drodrik/Research%20papers/UNIDOSep.pdf.
45. See HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 19-51 (2002). For instance, the United Kingdom provided
extensive export subsidies to textile products in the eighteenth century, id. at 21-22, the
United States offered subsidies to railway companies in the nineteenth century and
invested heavily in research and development of new technologies, id. at 30-31, and
Germany also subsidized a number of industries, including textiles and metals, id. at 33-
34. Other developed countries today, including France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan,
and the East Asian countries (NICs) all provided subsidies to promote their industries, id.
at 35-51.
46. LEE, supra note 2, at 79.
47. See supra notes 42-43.
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"Development-facilitation subsidy" or "DFS" can be considered in favor
of developing countries under certain income thresholds. Under this
scheme, developing countries are allowed to adopt otherwise prohibited
or actionable subsidies in accordance with their per-capita income
status. 48 The procedural requirements, comparable to those for the
DFT, would also be important for the DFS scheme to prevent abuse.
Anti-dumping (AD) is another area in which substantial trade
interests of developing countries are adversely affected. WTO rules
allow Members to adopt AD measures in the form of added tariffs where
they determine that imports are "dumped," i.e. sold at prices below
normal value. 49 The "normal value" is determined by comparison to the
home price or to an export price in a third country where a proper
comparison cannot be made for the market situation or a low sales
volume in the domestic market.50 The normal value can also be
"constructed" based on costs and reasonable profits.5 1 This regulatory
flexibility allows national authorities much latitude with anti-dumping
investigations, making AD measures the most prevalently adopted
trade measures of all. 52 There is little economic rationale for imposing
anti-dumping measures, 53 and particularly cheaper imports from
developing countries have been a major target for AD measures,
undermining the trade and development interests of developing
countries. 54
The determination of "normal value" is inherently arbitrary and
imprecise. For example, there may not be a single home market to
compare, and the complex adjusted average may have to be calculated
to come up with a reference home price.55 Where a comparison should
be made to an export price in a third country, there may not be a single
export price but potentially many substantially different prices. Where
a normal value needs to be constructed, the result can be vastly
different, depending on a specific methodology adopted to calculate
48. LEE, supra note 2, at 79. Since the objective of the DFS is to promote economic
development through export facilitation, it may not be used to support exports from
developing countries whose share in the export market is above certain thresholds and
that are already competitive.
49. ADP Agreement, supra note 10, art. 1.
50. Id. arts. 1-2.
51. Id. art. 2.
52. At the end of June, there were as many as 1,379 AD measures in force. WTO
Secretariat, Annual Report 2011, 40 (2011), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res
_e/booksp-e/anrep-e/anrep11_e.pdf.
53. LEE, supra note 2, at 94.
54. Between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010, over three-quarters of the 181 new AD
investigations were targeted to products from developing countries. WTO Committee on
Anti-Dumping Practices, REPORT (2010) OF THE COMMITTEE ON ANTI-DUMPING
PRACTICES, Annex C, G/L/935 (Oct. 28, 2010).
55. LEE, supra note 2, at 92.
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costs and average prices, not to mention that the measure of
"reasonable profit" can also vary.56 The national authorities have
almost free hands to determine the existence of dumping and the
dumping margin. Limited reform of the AD Agreement has been
proposed,57 but it is unlikely to remove the inherent arbitrariness from
the AD regime. As Yale economist T. N. Srinivasan has characterized,
AD is indeed the equivalent of "nuclear weapon in the armoury of trade
policy,"58 and the ADF should prohibit AD measures against imports
from developing countries altogether.
Certain trade-related government measures on investment
(TRIMs) are also regulated by WTO rules. TRIMs are important
government development policy tools, thus the rules regulating TRIMs
need to be examined. Provisions of the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures5 9 (TRIMs Agreement) prohibit a range of
investment measures that affect international trade.60 Those prohibited
TRIMs include local content requirements (imposing the use of a
certain amount of local inputs in production); import controls (requiring
imports used in local production to be equivalent to a certain proportion
of exports); foreign exchange balancing requirements (requiring the
foreign exchange made available for imports to be a certain proportion
of the value of foreign exchange brought in by the foreign investment
from exports and other sources); and export controls (obligating exports
to be equivalent to a certain proportion of local production). 61
Investment can contribute to economic development significantly
by bringing needed capital, technology, and management expertise to
the host nation, and some of the TRIMS are designed to maximize
investment's contribution to their development agenda. 62 While the
economic utility of TRIMs has been debated and the distorting trade
effect of TRIMs has been underscored, 63 the decision to adopt TRIMs
needs to be vested with developing countries. According to a recent
study, all of today's developed countries also adopted investment
56. Id. at 93.
57. See WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 1.
58. Int'l Institute for Sustainable Development, Report on the WTO's High-Level
Symposium on Trade and Development (Mar. 17-18, 1999), available at http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/summhl-e.pdf.
59. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 168
[hereinafter TRIMs Agreement].
60. The TRIMs Agreement prohibits investment measures that are inconsistent with
Articles III and XI of the GATT, which requires national treatment and the general
elimination of quantitative restrictions, respectively. Id. art. 2; GATT, supra note 10, arts.
III, XI.
61. TRIMs Agreement, supra note 59, annex, TT 1(a)-2(c).
62. LEE, supra note 2, at 114, 117.
63. Id. at 118.
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measures to meet their development objectives during their own
development.64 Reflecting this concern, twelve developing countries
proposed to change the text of the TRIMs Agreement to make
commitments under the agreement optional and not mandatory.65 It
would be indeed fair that today's developing countries should be
accorded the same opportunity to use TRIMs to promote economic
development. The ADF may include provisions to lift the application of
the TRIMs Agreement in favor of developing countries.
The current WTO rules on intellectual property rights (Agreement
on Trade-Related Property Rights66 or TRIPS Agreement) should also
be reconsidered in the context of development. Acquiring advanced
technology and knowledge is important for developing countries to
improve their industries and promote economic development,67 and this
tends to create tension between developing countries whose priority is
to acquire advanced technology and knowledge and developed countries
with an interest to protect them. Assigning proprietary rights to
technology and knowledge domestically through local IPR law and
internationally through conventions68 is an effort to protect them. The
TRIMS Agreement, the most extensive provisions in WTO legal
disciplines, 69 sets out mandatory standards for the protection of several
intellectual property rights (IPRs), including patents, trademarks,
copyrights, designs, and geographical indications, mandates protection
of foreign IPR holders by incorporating other major IPR conventions,
and requires enforcement against IPR violations. 70
While protection of IPRs is a legitimate interest, those extensive
requirements are counterproductive to the development effort of
developing countries whose legal and financial recourses may not be
64. Ha-Joon Chang & Duncan Green, The Northern WTO Agenda on Investment: Do
as we Say, Not as we Did, SOUTH CENTRE, 33 (June 2003), http://www.southcentre.
org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=380&Itemid=67 (follow "click here to
download" hyperlink).
65. World Trade Organization, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, 11
20-21, WT/GC/1354 (Oct. 11, 1999).
66. Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
67. LEE, supra note 2, at 123.
68. For instance, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 2,
1 1, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 11851, offers protection for foreign
patent holders and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, arts. 1-2, 1, Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30, does so for foreign copyright
holders.
69. TRIPS Agreement is composed of 73 Articles in seven parts. See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 66.
70. Id. arts. 9-12.
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sufficient for the extensive IPR protection. 7' The ADF should exempt
developing countries from the application of the TRIPS Agreement to
the extent that it imposes legislative requirements on them. This does
not mean that developed countries should give up their IPR interests in
the context of international trade. A better alternative is to develop
another set of rules and elaborate on the relevant provision of GATT
Article XX which allows Members to take measures to protect their IPR
interests, 72 so as to specify applicable measures as well as the
procedural and substantive requirements for the application of the
measures as has been the case with the adoption of the WTO
Agreement on Safeguards which was developed based on GATT Article
XIX. 73
Finally, the ADF may also require quota-free, tariff-free treatment
for imports from least-developed countries (LDCs). Some developed
countries have offered preferential treatment to LDCs. For instance,
the European Union has introduced the "Everything But Arms" (EBA)
initiative, offering duty-free and quota-free treatment to products
currently exported by LDCs. 7 4 Other countries, such as the United
States and Canada, offer similar preferential treatment to LDCs,
although less comprehensive and more limited in scope than the EBA
initiative.75 Considering the dire economic need of LDCs, an EBA-type
71. According to a study, implementing the TRIPS obligations "would require the
least developed countries to invest in buildings, equipment, training, and so forth that
would cost each of them $150 million - for many of the least developed countries this
represents a full year's development budget." J. Michael Finger, The WTO's Special
Burden on Less Developed Countries, 19 CATO J. 425, 435 (2000).
72. GATT Article XX provides in relevant part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent theadoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures: . . . (d) necessary to secure compliance with
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, including those relating to . . the protection of patents, trade
marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices ....
GATT, supra note 10, art. XX.
73. The Agreement on Safeguards elaborate on GATT Article XIX and provides a
detailed set of substantive and procedural requirements for the application of a safeguard
measure. See YONG-SHIK LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL
ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2007), for a detailed study of safeguard measures.
74. See Paul Brenton, Integrating the Least Developed Countries into the World
Trading System: The Current Impact of European Union Preferences Under "Everything
But Arms," 37 J. WORLD TRADE 623, 623-26 (2003), for an initial evaluation of the EBA
initiative.
75. For instance, the United States has implemented the Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act, which offers improved access to certain African, but not Asian, LDCs. Id.
at 644-45.
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of duty-free and quota-free treatment needs to be implemented by
developed countries and participating developing countries in the WTO.
A transitional period can be established for the complete removal of
trade barriers to sensitive products.7 6 Members would also have to
ensure that non-tariff measures do not undermine the trade benefit of
these preferences for LDCs. 77
III. WTO GOVERNANCE
A. Case for WTO Council for Trade and Development78
The present organizational structure of the WTO is not adequate to
address the development interests of developing countries at the
highest level. The main body in the WTO which deals with trade and
development issue is the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD).
The CTD reports to the General Council and has a mandate to address
certain trade and development issues such as implementation of
preferential provisions for developing countries, guidelines for technical
cooperation, increased participation of developing countries in the
trading system, and LDCs issues. The WTO provides assistance to
developing countries which focuses on capacity-building.79
The organizational status and mandate of the CTD is insufficient to
address fundamental trade and development issues such as finance and
debt relief in the context of trade, technological transfer which is key to
resolve capacity-building issues, and extensive regulatory reform to fill
the development deficit in the present regulatory framework. Those
core issues with ramifications that affect the WTO as a whole must be
addressed at the Council level, which is the highest decision making
body in the WTO organization. The trade and development issues cited
above require long-term attention and intense negotiation efforts at the
highest organizational level. LDC issues, which are now being
76. At the adoption of the EBA initiative, trade liberalization was complete except for
three products: fresh bananas, rice, and sugar, where tariffs were to be gradually reduced
to zero (in 2006 for bananas and 2009 for rice and sugar). Duty-free tariff quotas for rice
and sugar were to be increased annually. Id. at 625.
77. It has been observed that non-tariff measures, as well as stringent rules of origin,
continue to limit exports from LDCs significantly. Stefano Inama, Market Access for
LDCs: Issues to Be Addressed, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 85, 115 (2002). Applications of
administered protection, such as anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties, and
safeguards, can also diminish the beneficial effect of preference for LDCs.
78. LEE, supra note 2, ch. 2.3.2.
79. At present WTO assistance to developing countries focuses on capacity-building.
In this area, the WTO Secretariat primarily offers assistance through its Institute for
Training and Technical Cooperation. Assistance includes legal advice to some developing
countries, regular training sessions on trade policy in Geneva, and the organization of
approximately 400 technical cooperation activities annually, compromising both seminars
and workshops in developing countries and courses in Geneva.
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discussed at a subcommittee under the CTD, require attention and
work at a full committee level given the complexity and urgency of the
dire economic conditions of the LDC. This committee on LDCs can be
constituted under the proposed Council for Trade and Development.
The proposed organizational elevation of the CTD to a full Council
is well justified by comparison to the treatment of intellectual property
right issues in the WTO. IPRs have been promoted by a relatively small
number of developed Members within the WTO, but their importance
has been emphasized and recognized by instituting a separate Council
for Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights.80  Trade and
development issues are considered essentially important by the
majority of WTO membership, which is comprised of developing
countries. This majority interest should receive the comparable
attention and recognition by the WTO. Setting up a separate Council
for Trade and Development will be an affirmation of such recognition
and will allow trade and development issues to be addressed at the
highest institutional level.
B. Proposed Role of the Council for Trade and Development81
The role of the proposed Council should be set out to meet its
objective to advance the trade and development agenda in the WTO.
Thus the role of the new Council may include promotion of development
agendas and implementation of trade-related development assistance
policies, monitoring development and implementation of trade-related
rules and policies relevant to development interests of developing
countries, and establishment and supervision of subcommittees to
address specific development issues.
As to the implementation of trade-related development assistance
policies, the Council may on a regular basis identify problems and gaps
in the current trading system and practices in facilitating development
and set a trade and development agenda accordingly. This agenda may
be discussed at the Ministerial Conferences and in subsequent trade
negotiations to develop a more development-supportive regulatory
system and trade practices. This would include modifying relevant rules
where necessary. In promoting a trade and development agenda, the
Council may also cooperate with relevant international bodies such as
the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
(UNIDO). Through such cooperation, the trade and development
80. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 6, art. IV.
81. See LEE, supra note 2, ch. 2.3.2; Yong-Shik Lee, World Trade Organization and
Developing Countries, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW 109, 109-11 (Yong-Shik Lee et al. eds., 2011).
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agenda set by the WTO would be promoted and coordinated more
effectively and consistently.
In addition, the reform may include a mandatory reporting
requirement for all developed country Members and participating
developing country Members to file a "Trade-Related Development
Assistance Report" (TDAR) on a regular basis. This report would
identify and examine trade practices and activities of an individual
Member that are in compliance with the trade and development agenda
set by the Council, as well as those that are inconsistent with them.
The Council should examine TDARs on a regular basis and consult with
relevant Members to discuss their development assistance activities.
The Council could agree on specific commitments to be fulfilled by the
developed country Members and participating developing country
Members to promote the trade and development agenda, and the
Council may further examine, within a certain time period, whether
these commitments are being met.
The Trade and Development Council could also monitor compliance
with WTO provisions on development assistance, including the existing
S&D provisions, 82 GATT Articles XXXVI XXXVIII, as well as the pro-
development provisions proposed in the preceding section of this
chapter.83 A portion of this monitoring could be incorporated in the
TDAR. A violation of those provisions should be reported to the Council
if it is detrimental to the trade interests of developing country
Members. The Council may subsequently consult with the violating
Member to seek a resolution.
The TDAR could also monitor the commitments of developed
country Members to developing countries under GATT Article
XXXVII.8 4 Compliance with these commitments may require a broader
policy adjustment by the developed country Member, which may
necessitate monitoring by the Council. The Council should publish an
annual report on compliance with the development assistance
provisions and provide monitoring of any systematic compliance failure.
The Council may also include issues of compliance failure in the trade
and development agenda with a prospect of rule modification where
necessary.
Finally, the Council may also establish standing or ad-hoc
committees to address specific issues of trade and development that
require long-term attention, such as technological transfer between
developed and developing country Members. There should be at least
one committee specifically devoted to the problems of LDCs and another
82. See supra note 25.
83. See discussion supra Part II.B.
84. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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to assist with capacity building of developing countries to participate
fully in the trading system and realize its benefits. 85 Greater assistance
should also be provided to developing country Members involved in
costly and time-consuming trade disputes. Consideration should also be
given to whether it would better serve the needs of developing country
Members to assign the function of the existing WTO Advisory Centre to
a committee under the proposed Council for Trade and Development.
In either case, the current WTO Advisory Centre needs to be expanded
so that it can offer assistance to every developing country Member in
need of support with respect to the panel or Appellate Body
proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current regulatory framework for international trade under
the WTO is marked by "development deficit." The Uruguay Round
failed to elaborate and develop any of the development-facilitation
provisions in the GATT, such as Article XVIII and Articles XXXVI
XXXVIII, into a more detailed, enforceable set of rules in WTO
agreements, while it has done so in the other areas. 86 S&D provisions
in the WTO agreements are either temporary or insufficient to meet the
development interests of most developing countries.8 7 While market
access and freer trade is emphasized across the board, exceptions have
been legislated in the areas it does not serve the interests of many
developed countries, such as agriculture. The outcome is the clearly
imbalanced rules in the WTO system, which promotes the trade
interests of developed countries disproportionately, and undermines the
development interests of developing countries.
Also, the organizational structure of the WTO does not adequately
reflect on the interests of developing countries. While the trade
interests of developed countries, such as trade in services and trade-
related intellectual property rights, are regularly addressed at the
highest institutional level, in the Council for Trade in Services and the
Council for Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, the comparable
institutional weight has not been accorded to the development interests
of developing countries. There is no Council devoted to the trade and
development issues, only a Committee (CTD) under the General
Council, with an insufficient mandate to address fundamental trade
and development issues, which would require negotiations and
decisions at the highest level. Considering that over three-quarters of
85. The Aid for Trade done by the WTO has been helpful for developing countries in
this regard. See Aid for Trade, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/devel e/a4t e/aid4tradee.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
86. See discussion supra Part II.A.
87. Id.
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the entire WTO membership is developing countries, whose primary
membership interest is economic development through international
trade, the present organizational status of the CTD is not inappropriate
and should be elevated to the full Council level.
Since the inception of the WTO, world trade as a whole has
increased rapidly benefitting developed countries and some select
developing ones.88 However, many developing countries, particularly
least-developed countries, have not taken a fair share of economic
growth through trade.89 The forecited regulatory imbalance and the
inadequate institutional coverage of trade and development issues at
the WTO have contributed to this problem. The Doha Round was
launched to address the development deficit in the system, but its
successful conclusion is not in clear sight. Even if the present Round is
concluded, the development deficit in the WTO regulatory disciplines
and trade practices will not be cured. This chapter has proposed
regulatory and organizational reform to address this issue. It is hoped
that developed countries will join to support the necessary reform with
understanding that the successful development of developing countries
will provide markets for their own exports in future, as some of the
former developing countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore,
Hong Kong, and more recently, China, have shown.90 After all, the
proposed regulatory and institutional facilitation of development would
prove to be in the interest of all.
88. For instance, China has substantially increased its trade, particularly after
joining the WTO in 2001.
89. The LDC's share of world trade has declined by more than 40 percent since 1980
to a mere 0.4 percent. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Least
Developed Countries 1999 Report, at 106, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD[LCD/1999 (Jan. 12, 1999).
90. LEE, supra note 2, at 6-9.
2012 399
